10101 Executive Summary -- Computational Foundations of Social Choice by Brandt, Felix et al.
10101 Executive Summary
Computational Foundations of Social Choice
 Dagstuhl Seminar 
Felix Brandt1, Vincent Conitzer2, Lane A. Hemaspaandra3, Jean-Francois
Laslier4 and William S. Zwicker5
1 LMU München, DE
brandtf@tcs.ifi.lmu.de
2 Duke University, US
conitzer@cs.duke.edu
3 University of Rochester, US
eh@cs.rit.edu
4 Ecole Polytechnique - Palaiseau, FR
Jean-Francois.Laslier@polytechnique.edu
5 Union College - Schenectady, US
zwickerw@union.edu
Abstract. This seminar addressed some of the key issues in computa-
tional social choice, a novel interdisciplinary ﬁeld of study at the inter-
face of social choice theory and computer science. Computational social
choice is concerned with the application of computational techniques to
the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting rules and fair divi-
sion protocols, as well as with the integration of social choice paradigms
into computing. The seminar brought together many of the most active
researchers in the ﬁeld and focussed the research community currently
forming around these important and exciting topics.
Keywords. Social Choice Theory, Voting, Fair Division, Algorithms,
Computational Complexity, Multiagent Systems
Classical social choice theory deals with the design and analysis of methods for
collective decision making and plays an important role within economic theory as
witnessed by the Nobel prizes awarded to social choice theorists such as Kenneth
Arrow and Amartya Sen. Examples of collective decision making mechanisms are
voting rules and methods for the fair division of one or more goods among several
agents. For a few years now, researchers from computer science, in particular AI
and theory, have been taking an ever increasing interest in social choice. There
are two main reasons for that, leading to two diﬀerent lines of research.
The ﬁrst of these is concerned with importing concepts and methods from
theoretical computer science and AI for solving questions originally stemming
from social choice. The point of departure for this line of research is the fact
that most of the work in social choice theory has concentrated on establishing
abstract results regarding the existence of procedures meeting certain require-
ments. However, computational issues have rarely been considered. For instance,
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while there may not exist a voting protocol that makes it impossible for a voter
to manipulate it in one way or another, it may well be the case that any such ma-
nipulation can be rendered computationally infeasible, and may thus be deemed
an acceptable risk.
The second line of research within computational social choice goes in the
other direction, i.e., concepts and procedures from social choice theory are im-
ported to solve questions that arise in computer science and AI application
domains. This is, for instance, the case for managing societies of autonomous
software agents, which calls for negotiation and voting procedures. Other exam-
ples are the application of techniques from social choice to the development of
webpage ranking systems for Internet search engines or recommender systems
for electronic commerce.
The seminar brought together 44 researchers who have worked on various
aspects of computational social choice, and who have come to this area from
very diﬀerent backgrounds: theoretical computer science, artiﬁcial intelligence,
economics, operations research, mathematics, and political science. Only half of
the participants were computer scientists. Despiteor maybe because ofthis
heterogeneity, every talk was followed by a long and lively discussion. There
was a total of 34 talks plus a rump session consisting of about ten short (5-
minute) presentations. Participants originated from 19 diﬀerent countries with
the majority being from France, Germany, and the USA.
A wide variety of topics were discussed during the seminar. Common research
themes that emerged included manipulability, approval voting, cake-cutting al-
gorithms, tournaments, and abstention. We are currently preparing a special
issue of the journal Mathematical Social Sciences (edited by Felix Brandt and
Bill Zwicker) consisting of work presented at this seminar.
